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ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF NSSM 141 STUDY:

Implications for U.S. Policy of the
Participation of The People's Republic of China in Multilateral Diplomacy

[General Comment: The study is a good brief on the problems we are likely to face as the result of Chinese presence in the UN. It tends, however, to examine each problem within its own terms. Our bracketed comments, however, are focused upon the potential of each issue or suggested course of action for bettering or worsening the atmosphere for the President's visit to Peking. In almost no case do we see much promise for betterment, thus our comments are consistently in the direction of deferring action, and ignoring whatever pale glimmers of promise might lie with US initiatives taken prior to the President's visit.]

Introduction - PRC and US Objectives and Attitudes

Three elements will go into the PRC's multilateral diplomacy: (1) assertion of Third World leadership against "superpower domination"; (2) practical self-interest, and (3) log-rolling to achieve its ends. The first will be the most important for some time.

The PRC's immediate political objective will be exclusion of the ROC -- as an integral part of China -- from UN-related organizations and international conferences. However, the PRC may itself choose not to participate actively in many organizations and conferences, perhaps including the International Financial Institutions.

We expect a major PRC effort -- probably after the President's visit -- to isolate the US on the Taiwan question in the UN, possibly including a resolution recommending the end of our "occupation" there.

In general, the PRC will move slowly and selectively into international forums, going to those (e.g., ECOSOC, ECAFE, LOS and Environment Conferences) where she can champion the weak against the strong or achieve specific objectives. She may decline participation in meetings compromising to her non-superpower image.

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On colonial and economic development issues, she will put ideology and propaganda ahead of practicability. On disarmament, she will press radical measures both to embarrass the Soviets and ourselves and to preclude lesser measures which would hinder her own aspirations (like the French).

However, the credibility of her leadership role will require concrete results, and in the long run, the PRC should become more pragmatic.

We don't know how strongly the PRC will press Asian issues. The paper discusses Korean and Taiwan issues and more briefly Vietnam and Cambodia, but does not touch on PRC attitudes toward Japan which will also be a problem. PRC entry will make the Japanese goal of a permanent Security Council seat more difficult to attain.

US Posture should include three elements:

1. Facilitate PRC participation in UN activities either where its presence is inevitable or where there is a basis for cooperation; [As a general proposition this is sound, but we should not play a conspicuous role at this time since this could excite PRC and/or Soviet suspicion and mistrust.]
2. Discourage the PRC from taking a propagandistic outlook and encourage substantive discussions of mutual advantage; [Again, this is all right in general, but for the immediate present -- especially before the Peking trip -- we should avoid offering gratuitous advice.]
3. Preserve a place for the ROC on the international scene, at least as regards economic arrangements. The paper assumes, pending a separate study of US/ROC relations, that we want to keep the ROC in multilateral diplomacy, where feasible, but without expending a lot of diplomatic capital to do it.

The paper sees the following potential opportunities for us from PRC presence:

1. The Soviets may in some cases move to more constructive positions [possibly, but this happy thought is not credibly demonstrated];
2. The PRC might eventually come to join certain disarmament arrangements, like the NPT;

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3. Chinese entry might provide the occasion for revitalizing the original UN peacekeeping concept;
[Strong UN peacekeeping is an old State Department hobby-horse. I doubt the Chinese will support it, or even that we ourselves ought to favor it, since the UN has become less subject to our influence.]
4. If the Chinese are interested in technical discussions like population, drug control, and environment, their presence would help. But it may take a while to learn how they feel about these things;
5. Peking's presence might enhance Security Council effectiveness re the Indo-Pakistani war.
[This assumption -- written before the Security Council meeting -- is being tested as this summary is written. I find it doubtful.]

The introduction concludes with the interesting conclusion that no difficult policy choices surfaced in preparation of the paper. Problems are essentially tactical -- how to obtain PRC cooperation in some cases, how to deal with troublesome PRC actions, how to protect ROC positions without spending too much capital. [This is true. I do not think the issues explored in the remainder of the paper require individual consideration by the SRG. What we need to establish, rather, is the conceptual basis for determining the style of our actions.]

I. ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS

A. ARMS LIMITATION

1. US Objectives

- a. Involve the PRC in discussions.
- b. Give away as little as possible of the present institutional framework, like the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which is small and effective and which works through consensus without voting.
- c. Conversely, avoid institutionalization of a large new forum.
- d. Facilitate identification of mutual US and PRC arms control interests.

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e. Avoid jeopardizing arms control relations with the USSR, our allies, and important non-aligned countries.

2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems

a. The PRC won't join the CCD as presently constituted (US-USSR co-chairmanship) and might not join any similar group.

b. Although opposed to the Soviet World Disarmament Conference (WDC), the PRC may later put forward a similar initiative, to replace the CCD. This would facilitate propaganda rather than constructive action. But eventually the PRC might accept a relatively limited and effective group.

c. On substance, the PRC will initially seek support for a prohibition on nuclear weapons use. It has criticized the treaties already negotiated (Limited Test Ban, NPT, Seabed Arms Control) as designed to preserve the US/USSR nuclear predominance. Eventually, the PRC might see treaties like NPT as in its own interest.

d. The PRC will not accept existing limitations on its own nuclear tests and will probably seek to deflect international pressure toward the US and the USSR for a comprehensive test ban.

3. Alternative Courses of Action

a. Propose or accept PRC participation in the CCD, or similar forum, and indicate a willingness to change the US/USSR co-chairmanship and perhaps add a few new members.

Advantage: Help avoid loss of support for a small forum even if the PRC does not come in.

Disadvantage: PRC might react negatively, if it saw this as pressure to join.

b. Discuss the issues, both forums and substance (as outlined in D. 3M 124) with the PRC delegation.

Advantages:

-- This is normal UN practice;

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-- We might influence the PRC to accept a smaller forum;

-- We would learn more of their attitudes.

Disadvantages:

-- This would provoke Soviet suspicions, if we didn't also consult with them;

-- The PRC might interpret the move as pressure and react negatively.

c. Press for regular CCD meetings in 1972, even if the PRC does not join.

Advantages:

-- We would buy time;

-- We might increase the chance that the eventual solution would resemble the CCD;

-- We would avoid appearing paralyzed by PRC non-participation;

-- We would avoid Soviet resentment that we were more interested in accommodating the PRC than in substantive arms control talks.

Disadvantage:

The action might be interpreted as unwillingness to facilitate PRC participation, leading to opposition to the forum.

d. Play no active role until we know more about PRC attitudes.

Advantage:

Avoid misunderstandings with the PRC and the Soviets.

Disadvantages:

-- The PRC and others might move in directions congenial to us, so we would later face more difficult problems;

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-- The Soviets and others would probably regard our passivity as an abandonment of leadership (with the USSR) in arms control.

e. If the PRC won't join the CCD or similar forum, propose or support a meeting of the UN Disarmament Conference (UNDC).

Advantages:

-- Provide a transitional step for the PRC and France to enter something like the CCD;

-- Limit pressures for a World Disarmament Conference. The UNDC has the advantage of being within the UN framework, and participation by the divided states would be easier to handle.

Disadvantage:

A UNDC would be unwieldy, propagandistic, and run the danger of becoming institutionalized.

f. Wait until after the President's visit for bilateral talks on forums and substance.

Advantage:

The Chinese might work with us more constructively on these issues.

Disadvantage:

The forum question may move too fast.

[Much of the foregoing is OBE since we have already instructed USUN to support scheduling the next meeting of the CCD, making clear that the door is open to PRC and French participation if they wish it, and that the US/USSR co-chairmanship is also open. This, I believe, is a sensible combination of alternatives (a) and (c). We do not need to go further at this point. Initiation of bilateral talks before the President's visit risks a negative reaction.]

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B. OCEAN PROBLEM

1. US Objectives

Get the PRC to cooperate in achieving our ends, or at least find more limited areas of common interest.

2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems

a. Territorial Seas: The PRC has supported 200 mile claims of Latin Americans but has not made equivalent claims for itself [it claims 12 miles]. This provides some mileage in opposition to US "imperialism."

b. Straits: [We want a right of free transit.] The PRC does not itself straddle international straits less than 24 miles wide, and has a trade interest in easy access through the Straits of Malacca and Indonesia. So, she could conceivably support us. On the other hand, she might prefer to see our (and the Soviet) naval mobility hindered (her own navy is now coast-oriented).

c. Seabeds: The PRC has attacked our draft convention on seabeds as "a futile attempt to dominate the oceans". But acceptance would accommodate some real Chinese interests by strengthening most of her claims in the East China and Yellow Seas and by giving her a large trusteeship zone in the South China Sea. [However, the Chinese might be even better off by relying on customary international law, generally held to have been codified in part of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.]

d. Fisheries, Marine Pollution and Scientific Research: The PRC has not yet indicated its attitude on these.

e. Questions of PRC Participation in Negotiations: While the PRC will want to attend the 1973 LOS Conference, we don't yet know if it wants to participate in the preparatory negotiations. We anticipate that she will work adversely to our objectives, by encouraging the 200 mile LA states.

3. Suggested Actions

a. Support proposals to bring the PRC into the preparatory work. This would be accepting the inevitable, but run the danger of obstructionism.

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b. Initiate bilateral discussions. This could encourage constructive action and identify areas for cooperation, but could ruffle the feathers of the USSR and Japan.

[There is no necessity for us to take any action at this time. I recommend inaction.]

C. PEACEKEEPING

1. US Objective

Achieve workable guidelines for future UN peacekeeping efforts. Keep the PRC apart from the USSR on this.

2. PRC Attitude

The PRC might be hostile to UN peacekeeping as foreign interference or might favor it as an alternative to super-power domination. In any case, the Chinese will probably want the powers of the Security Council (where they have the veto) strengthened as against the Secretary General. Thus, they will probably favor the general Soviet position.

3. Suggested Actions

- a. Postpone peacekeeping discussions.
- b. Accept, but not solicit, PRC participation in discussions.
- c. Encourage PRC to take a serious, non-propagandistic approach.

[This posture seems right, but should not be attempted prior to the President's visit.]

D. OUTER SPACE

1. US Objective

Establish a cooperative relationship with the PRC.

2. PRC Attitudes

We don't yet know what they are.

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3. Alternative Courses of Action

a. Encourage PRC adherence to the Outer Space Liability Convention, the Outer Space Treaty and the Astronaut Rescue and Return Treaty. This would be an affirmative gesture, which even if the Chinese rejected it, would cost us nothing. [There is some risk that they might interpret it as unwarranted pressure.]

b. Support PRC membership in the UN Outer Space Committee and its Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites. The PRC clearly "belongs," and there are good prospects for accommodating our two positions on some issues. On the other hand, they could be obstructionist and charge super-power collusion.

[We need do nothing here at this time.]

II. POLITICAL ISSUES

A. KOREA

We support, and the PRC opposes, all aspects of UN involvement in Korea.

1. US Objectives

Try to improve the political climate on the Korean peninsula, and remove its problems as bones of contention between the north and south and between the US and China.

Avoid a full-scale confrontation with the PRC, prevent a repudiation of the UN role, maintain the useful aspects of the UN presence, while removing those that are not, and maintain the credibility of US defense commitments.

Our overall policy in Korea is currently being reviewed through the PARA (Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation) study on Korea. [The PARA studies are a State Department initiated system of annual inter-agency policy reviews by country. Begun in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, they now include all regional bureaus except the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs.]

2. Chinese Attitude

The PRC has in the past called for nullification of all UN resolutions relating to the Korean War, a theme repeated in muted fashion in Chiao Kuan-hua's maiden speech. However, there's no reason to think she wants the Military Armistice Commission disbanded in the absence of an overall settlement.

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Alternative Courses of Action

a. We could propose admitting the two Koreas to the UN next year. This would be consistent with the growing trend toward universality, might be acceptable to the ROK, would accelerate North-South bilateral relations, and would put the PRC or the USSR on the defensive if they opposed the move or North Korea rejected it.

b. Short of proposing membership, we could suggest inviting the Koreas to participate in next year's Korean debate, without the usual conditions.

c. Resist any effort by the PRC to repeal the Korean War resolutions.

d. Accept, as a bargaining counter, the dissolution or modification of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). UNCURK is of marginal utility, and could be discontinued provided we and the ROK reach a prior understanding on alternative approaches to Korean unification.

e. Relinquish the UN Command, but maintain the Armistice Agreement (substituting the ROK for the UN) and our channels of communication with North Korea. We would also need to decide how to terminate our operational control of ROK armed forces, substituting a bilateral command relationship with the ROK.

[Over the long haul the questions of our relationship to the ROK forces and the UN in South Korea will have to be addressed, if only because of some pressures for unification. But moves such as proposed above to try to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and move in the direction of unification are extremely complex and involve, in a fundamental way, the nature of our relationships with the ROK and cannot be decided simply in the framework of PRC attitudes alone. In the short run, and certainly in advance of the President's China trip, therefore, we should try to preserve the present situation as is. Further, it is unlikely that between now and February the PRC will propose initiatives on Korea that would bring us into serious conflict in the UN. If they did so, for example by proposing General Assembly nullification of the Korean War resolutions or dissolution of UNCURK and the UN Command, we should make a serious (and, if possible, low-profile) effort to defeat Peking's plays.]

B. MIDDLE EAST

1. US Objectives

Prevent the PRC from complicating steps toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, and limit PRC (and Soviet) influence in the Middle East.

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2. PRC Attitudes

The PRC sees Middle Eastern instability as in its interest, and has supported radical elements of the Arab cause. The Chinese apparently don't want to join the Four Power talks. They have taken positions contrary to Security Council Resolution 242, and we do not know if they would support settlement efforts in the UN framework.

3. Suggested Actions

The US should continue its present efforts. If the PRC seeks a role, we should insist that they accept SC Resolution 242 as the basis of negotiations and a final settlement. [Agree.]

C. INDIA-PAKISTAN

1. US Objective

Containing the conflagration in South Asia.

[Consideration of this problem has now become OBE.]

D. SOUTHERN AFRICA

We and the PRC will be on opposite sides on Southern African issues. These will arise in the Security Council almost immediately regarding Rhodesia, Portuguese Territories and Namibia.

1. US Objective

Have Chinese positions measured by how they promote practical possibilities for peaceful change toward racial equality. [I.e., try to expose radical positions as non-constructive.]

2. PRC Attitudes

The PRC will seize on racial and colonial issues to try to maximize its influence on Africa. This could make life more difficult for us at the UN and could also bring the Chinese into conflict with our national interests in the area.

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Suggested Actions

Continue to work for peaceful change in Southern Africa. Try to restrain the African tendency to get the UN to use force, apply sanctions, eject South Africa and Portugal and provide support for liberation movements. We should also work closely with black African states suspicious of the Chinese and encourage the white regimes to avoid actions that play into PRC hands.

[In short, there is nothing here we can do except continue what we're doing. The initiative is in the PRC hands to make life more difficult for us.]

E. TAIWAN

1. US Objective

To limit the damage from the campaign the PRC will wage against us on this issue -- damage to our developing relations with the PRC, to US-ROC relations and US interests in the Taiwan area, and to the international position of the ROC.

2. PRC Attitudes

The PRC will want to undermine the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty and press for a removal of US forces from Taiwan. It will want to isolate the ROC internationally. At the UN the PRC may attack us on the issue verbally and could introduce a resolution charging that our "occupation" of Taiwan is aggression and interference in the PRC's internal affairs.

3. Alternative US Courses of Action

These relate to the extent to which we will reply to such attacks when they come. The stronger the reply the more we exacerbate relations with Peking, but a weak reply or none risks signalling to Peking that our position is weak, which might stimulate further attacks. At a minimum we could present our policy in an objective tone, point out that we have no designs on Taiwan or any other Chinese territories and do not want any rights, privileges, or permanent bases. We could express the hope that our disagreement on this issue would not preclude businesslike relations on other matters. If we were to have private discussions with Peking we could try to dissuade

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them from debating the issue at the UN. [But we should not initiate such discussions prior to the Peking trip.]

F. VIETNAM

1. US Objectives

At a minimum, keep the PRC presence at the UN from frustrating our objectives; at a maximum actively enlist them in the search for peace. [But this latter seems a clear non-starter for the present.]

2. PRC Attitudes

PRC cooperation to end the war is most unlikely in the short run. Rather, the PRC will probably use the UN to attack our Vietnam policy. However, PRC presence at the UN will provide an opportunity to engage in bilateral exploration of the problems of a settlement, POWs, economic rehabilitation.

3. Suggested Actions

a. Seek support for a program of economic rehabilitation of all Indochina under UN auspices.

b. Propose UN admission for both Vietnams.

[For the immediate future neither of these initiatives seem promising; our posture therefore should be to react moderately, rather than to act.]

G. CAMBODIA

We would want to defend the present Cambodian Government, if the PRC questions its legality in favor of Sihanouk.

[Here again, our posture is to react rather than act.]

H. MICRONESIA

The current General Assembly will discuss Micronesia probably

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routinely. Next May the Trusteeship Council takes up the issue and the Chinese will more probably weigh in strongly then.

1. US Objective

Prevent Chinese interference with establishment of an internally self-governing Micronesia with US control retained over foreign affairs and defense.

2. PRC Attitudes

The PRC will probably try to block our plan, to picture us as colonialists and to preclude our use of the area for military bases. They could try to persuade the Trusteeship Council not to recommend approval of a new status compact, and on the Security Council they could veto approval.

3. Suggested Actions

We can out-vote the PRC in the Trusteeship Council and can try to avoid the effect of a Security Council veto by arguing that notification to the Security Council is all that is needed. We should also work to meet Micronesian grievances and be as forthcoming in the negotiations as we can.

[For the immediate future, we need decide only to respond to challenge as non-polemically as possible.]

I. SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

1. US Objectives

We can try to minimize the politicization of the specialized agencies which would probably be encouraged by PRC entry and we could try to preserve a place for the ROC in certain special cases [like the international financial institutions].

2. PRC Attitude

The PRC wants to drive the ROC from all specialized agencies, though it is not yet clear whether the PRC itself plans to join.

3. Suggested Actions

a. Towards the PRC: We should continue use of the agencies for political purposes and to oppose expulsion of unpopular

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members like Portugal and South Africa. At the same time, it is in our interest to see the PRC engaged in the technical operations of those agencies which it does join.

b. Toward the ROC. We should continue to try to preserve ROC membership at least in the financial institutions, though we will probably fail if the PRC actively seeks membership. We can also try to help the ROC to benefit from technical activities of those agencies from which it has departed.

[Focusing on the international financial institutions, State and Treasury are presently working out tactics to try to preserve ROC representation in these agencies -- in which there is a fair chance of succeeding as long as the PRC does not indicate an interest in joining. If the ROC loses here, not only will it be likely to be expelled from all UN-associated agencies, but it will also lose the basis for its participation in any UN-related conferences and conventions (for which it must retain representation in at least one UN-associated agency). The basic question as regards tactics is one of determining how far we can go in support of the ROC position without substantially increasing the PRC's antagonism toward us on this score.]

III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

A. ENVIRONMENT

The PRC will probably participate actively in the June 1972 Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. We would like to see them be constructive. While the Chinese are concerned with industrial pollution, we expect them to champion the LDC position that pollution stems from development, and solutions should therefore be financed by the developed world.

Suggested Actions

We can persuade others (the Conference Secretary General Strong, or mutually friendly nations) to explore the PRC views and encourage them to take constructive action, or we could discuss environmental matters bilaterally perhaps during the President's visit to Peking.

[We need do nothing before the trip.]

B. DRUG CONTROL

1. US Objectives

We would like PRC cooperation in international drug control.

2. PRC Attitudes

The Chinese seem to have an excellent record of internal

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controls and there is no evidence they have engaged in illicit international traffic.

3. Alternative Courses of Action

Consult with them bilaterally to explain our proposal to amend the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to put teeth into the international control mechanism (an international conference is scheduled for March 1972). [This could be taken up during the Peking visit; it should not be done before.] If their attitudes are positive, get them deeply involved; if not, minimize the damage.

C. OTHER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS

ECOSOC, UNCTAD, UNDP

We would wish to encourage PRC constructive action but expect them to exacerbate differences between developed and developing countries. We could welcome PRC participation [we could not keep them out even if we wished] . They have already been elected to ECOSOC. We could counter their propaganda attacks with straightforward statements of what we have done for underdeveloped countries and suggestions that PRC aid increasingly go through multilateral channels.

[We need take no initiatives now.]

D. POPULATION CONTROL

We can encourage General Draper, our Representative to the UN Population Commission, to go to Peking to persuade the Chinese to contribute to the UN population fund and support other activities. [To say the least, this would be premature and would be interpreted as a crude form of pressure unless and until we have elicited PRC views and conclude they would be receptive.] We could also encourage the Chinese to attend multilateral meetings on population matters. [Again, we need to know their attitude first.] If their position proves negative, we could try to counter it by noting that they practice family planning at home.

[We should take no initiatives now.]

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INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ACTIVITIES

These problems will need to be handled case by case. We could consult with the PRC but this would falsely imply an eagerness to see them join. Where the PRC decides to join, we should welcome them [we could not keep them out even if we wished] and encourage constructive participation. More immediately we must try to preserve ROC presence where it has significant trade interests, e.g., the present International Sugar Agreement. If we can't do this, we should look for alternative ways to preserve ROC cooperation in the orderly marketing and pricing which are in our own national interests.

[The general approach set forth here applies equally well to the PRC/ROC participation in any number of multilateral forums.]

F. RED CROSS CONFERENCE

A Red Cross Conference to revise Geneva conventions on the laws of war will be held in May 1972. The PRC will be invited. We would like to see the PRC support the conference or at least not obstruct it. The Chinese are likely to support anti-colonial provisions on freedom fighters and efforts to ban or restrict the use of napalm and perhaps other weapons. It is premature at this stage to provide alternative ways of handling possible PRC positions.

[Agree. These can be formulated in the light of the Peking visits.]

IV. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

A. PRC and ROC ADHERENCE TO CONVENTIONS

[These highly technical questions involve, on the one hand, our ability to protect the ROC's opportunity to enter into multilateral agreements and to deny the German Democratic Republic the right to do so. The latter consideration will cease to be a factor, when the German negotiations conclude. If we are a depository for a particular convention, we will be able to allow Taipei to accede (either under an "all states" formula or, under the "Vienna formula", if Taipei remains a member of any specialized agency). The question will be the extent to which we wish to irritate Peking for Taipei. Presumably, this irritation will be minor compared with that caused by our retention of our defense commitments. In any case, the questions raised in this section will need to be considered in the context of the study of overall ROC/US relations, and no decisions can be expected from this SRG.]

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1. US Objectives

a. Existing multilateral agreements:

(i) With respect to the PRC, where we have a special reason to do so, encourage PRC participation, (e. g., narcotics conventions, air hijacking convention);

(ii) With respect to the ROC, where the ROC has not yet become a party, we would have a choice as regards those conventions to which accessions are governed by the "Vienna formula" (accessions by any state member of the UN or of any specialized agencies or the IAEA, or the statute of the ICJ). We could support ROC adherence so long as it remains a member of any specialized agency. This would make the treaty more universal but it would irritate our relations with the PRC, would probably fail, and would provide an impetus for PRC efforts to eject the ROC from all specialized agencies. Where the formula for accession is "all states/triple depository" and we are one of the depositories, we could insure the ROC's right to become a party.

b. Future multilateral agreements:

(i) If the "Vienna formula" were involved, much would turn on the depository. The UN Secretariat would probably exclude the ROC even if it remained a member of a specialized agency and so should be technically included. A friendly state depository might accept both the PRC and the ROC, but this would be objectionable to the Soviets and the PRC. Triple depositories could be used with the "Vienna formula" but the Chinese and the Soviets would object to this too.

(ii) The "all states/multiple depository formula" would allow the PRC to accede at some capitals (Moscow and London) and the ROC to accede at Washington. This would irritate our relations with the PRC. Furthermore, the PRC might itself insist on being a depository and this would allow it to assist its friends like the Sihanouk Regime. This formula would also permit the German Democratic Republic to accede and this would trouble the FRG, especially now.

(iii) An "all states formula/single depository" would include the PRC and might also allow the ROC to accede if the depository were a friendly state. The fact that the GDR might join would disturb the FRG.

(iv) A new formula combining the "Vienna formula" with a clause permitting accession by generally unrecognized entities would be

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opposed by the PRC since it could be interpreted as giving status to the ROC. The FRG would object because it enhances the chances of the GDR.

B. UN FINANCES

As a major contributor, the PRC might want to hold down budgetary costs -- an interest which could conflict with their desire to champion LDC interests in retaining, and perhaps enlarging, technical assistance programs.

Alternative Courses of Action

If the Chinese attitude seems similar to our own we could consider inviting it and Japan to join the Big Four group on budgetary and administrative problems. The Chinese might refuse, based on a desire to avoid another form of Big Power dominance.

[We do not need to consider doing this now, and should not do so.]

There is also a question of whether the PRC will assume the obligation of ROC arrearages (a little over \$30 million). But this is a problem the US need not directly engage.

C. SECRETARY GENERAL

Since all permanent members of the Security Council have a veto, all must approve any candidate for the Secretary Generalship. U Thant's term runs out at the end of the year and we have no alternative but to consult the PRC and other permanent members.

[Agree. If we refused to consult, others would act without us and we would be faced with unpalatable choices, such as an extension of U Thant's term, or being forced into a conspicuously negative posture of vetoing proposals without having alternatives to offer.]

D. PRC PERSONNEL IN UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

The PRC will undoubtedly claim an Under Secretary Generalship, an Assistant Secretary Generalship, and several senior career grade posts.

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We do not know where exactly these will be because shifts in position will follow the appointment of the new Secretary General. [The paper describes some of our own alternatives in getting senior Secretariat slots but no clear projections are possible at this time.] The paper observes that we would not want to lose senior key posts to the PRC nor see them in positions of excessive influence or sensitivity. We'd like to see their claims satisfied at the expense of the Soviet Union or Eastern European countries.

[The key question, of course, is how we advance this interest, but at this juncture it doesn't seem possible to say more than that we try to avoid leaving scars.]